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RECENT BOOKS 
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS. By Karl N. Llewel-
lyn. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1960. Pp. xii, 565. $8.50. 
The author's central theme, on which he plays innumerable varia-
tions, relates to his observation, extensively documented by random sam-
plings of appellate opinions from many different jurisdictions, of a strong 
and accelerating trend in the last decade or two away from a style of 
decision and opinion-writing which he calls "The Formal Style," and 
toward general use of a "Grand Style" once familar but for some decades 
forgotten. The "Formal Style" is that mode of decision and opinion-
writing which proceeds from the "orthodox ideology" of a closed system 
of pre-existing law applied mechanically by judges who disclaim creation 
in the process and think of their technique as involving mere deduction 
from ascertained premises. The "Grand Style," in contrast, assumes a duty 
on the part of the court to carry on a continuous judicial review of judge-
made law, to "view precedents as welcome and very persuasive, but ... to 
test a precedent almost always against three types of reason before it is 
accepted": the reputation of the opinion-writing judge; principle, which 
means "no mere verbal tool for bringing large-scale order into rules, it 
means a broad generalization which must yield patent sense as well as 
order"; and, finally, policy, "in terms of prospective consequences of the 
rule under consideration, comes in for explicit examination by reason in 
a further test of both the rule in question and its application" (p. 36). 
The author's skepticism of the effectiveness of "mere law" is pervasive. 
As every Llewellyn reader has long known, in any case which merits 
appeal a letter perfect case on the law alone can be made for each 
side, and will be if both are competently represented. The big question, 
therefore, is why does and why should the court choose one proffered solu-
tion rather than the other; follow one line of authority and distinguish 
the other? If this question is answerable, and Llewellyn now believes that 
it is, a platform may be established from which prediction and advocacy 
can operate with reasonable assurance despite the ambivalence of doctrine. 
Since the answer is not to be found in the law alone it may perhaps be 
found in the facts; not the unique facts of the case at hand, but the factual 
description of the type-situation of which the problem is a special 
instance. The "Grand Style" is centered upon a conscious effort by the 
court through the application of horse sense and reason to adduce, to 
understand, and as accurately and pungently as possible to describe in the 
opinion the true nature of the type-situation with which the case is 
concerned. When the court finally pins a label on the situation the solu-
tion is just around the corner, for the basic premise of the argument relat-
ing to court technique is expressed by a quotation from Levin Goldschmidt 
that "every fact-pattern of common life ... carries within itself its appro-
[ 119] 
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priate, natural rules, its right law. . . . The highest task of law-giving con-
sists in uncovering and implementing this immanent law" (p. 122). Each 
problem is an instance of a type-situation which has been described in 
earlier cases, but the problem case always calls upon the court for a 
re-examination of that type-situation, and a further effort to understand 
and to describe it more accurately than before. The process typically pro-
duces, by interaction between past authorities and present facts, an am-
bulatory category responsive both to changed conditions and to new knowl-
edge. All this is made more or less inevitable by leeways in the use of 
precedent which have been legitimized by long usage, and are so much a 
part of the common law lawyer's conditioning that he is scarcely aware of 
their existence. The principal difference between a "Grand Style" and a 
"Formal Style" opinion, therefore, may be in the court's awareness of what 
it is doing, and in its candor in exposing and describing the reasons for 
doing it. 
The book was written not merely for academic reasons, but as an 
attempt to exorcise a "crisis in confidence" in the work of our appellate 
courts which Llewellyn finds exists particularly among members of the 
bar, to whom it is most hurtful because of its effect upon their self-regard. 
As he sees it, the loss of confidence arises from a feeling that court decisions 
have become unreckonable, leaving the lawyer no basis for pride in crafts-
manship. It is unjustified, however, for it results from the lawyers' failure 
to keep track of what the courts are doing; their failure to become aware 
of the new style of decision and its implications. To the initiated there is 
in fact much less unreckonability than there was when the "Formal Style" 
was the rule; less unreckonability than that which is deemed entirely toler-
able in the formation of normal business judgments. The reason lawyers 
have failed to keep pace with the developing "Grand Style" is that they 
have had their eyes riveted on doctrine, on the "rules" of law, when they 
should have been watching the decisional process to detect factors which 
were bothering or helping a given court in reaching its decisions. The 
lawyer should study his court as assiduously as he studies his "law," and 
his cases in historical and functional groups rather than as single prece-
dents. He must come to understand that rules of law come equipped with 
widely variant horsepowers, that if application of the seemingly appropriate 
rule is compatible with "sense" reckonability of result is great, but that if 
the contrary is true the rule comes without warranties and prediction must 
depend on other factors. To achieve reasonable effectiveness as a prophet 
the average lawyer needs only to be able to determine how his court will 
see the sense of the situation, and utilize this as his guide to whether the 
"rule" and his application of it are likely to stand up. 
The discussion relates, then, to two techniques, that of the court and 
that of the lawyer advocate-counsellor. While in his view of court tech-
nique Llewellyn argues that each type-situation has an "immanent law,'' a 
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situational sense, he freely concedes that his own estimate of the situation 
frequently differs from that of the court, even when the court follows the 
"Grand Style." This suggests that a given situation may have more than 
one "immanent law," that the light of good sense which halos the result 
may well be a reflected light having as its source the observer's own 
values, or his interest. There is, in other words, a degree of ambivalence 
in the "immanent law" as well as in the doctrine. For this reason the 
lawyer's predictive technique is based on a study of the values of the 
particular court wherein his problem will arise. When the lawyer has 
made such a study, Llewellyn argues, he will find that the unreckonable 
has become reckonable, and his confidence in the courts will thereby be 
regenerated. 
Llewellyn does not make clear his position on the more violent judicial 
changes in existing law. The continuous change which is a condition of 
the "Grand Style" is for the most part the kind of adjustment which I 
would suppose lawyers generally consider normal, which is made more or 
less inevitable by the character of our precedent system. When the tempo 
and amplitude of creation are greatly increased, however, when the court 
faces situations in which a choice must be made between existing doctrine 
and a solution clearly beyond the pale of that doctrine, the little twist that 
is within the accepted leeways of "following" precedent will not do the 
job, and the court nevertheless repeatedly decides that the job ought to 
be done, that the legislature has not done it, and that it, the court, there-
fore will-this, I believe, is not a pattern of behavior that either lawyers 
or the general public in this country expect from their judges. One of his 
reviewers has interpreted the "Grand Style" as a method which calls for 
the rule to be tested against experience, and if it does not square with 
experience, to be discarded or reworked.1 I am not certain that Llewellyn's 
position is as swashbuckling as this interpretation would indicate. Of the 
"Grand Style" he says that "touch with the past is too close, the mood is 
too craft-conscious, the need for the clean line is too great, for the renova-
tion to smell of revolution or, indeed, of campaigning reform" (p. 36). 
It may be his fate again to be misunderstood, for like the realist writing 
from the beginning, the "Grand Style" will surely become the explanation 
for further flexing of judicial muscles. 
Llewellyn seeks to establish, by comparing techniques in use today with 
those used in our courts up until the later decades of the last century, that 
the "Grand Style" is nothing new, that it is essentially the same today as 
it was then, and therefore has the full blessing of tradition, is not a 
departure from what the public should expect of its judges. He denies 
that the nineteenth century "Grand Style" was merely the way in which 
courts worked in the "formative era" of our law, and argues its superiority 
1 Breitel, Book Review, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 937 (1961). 
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in any era. Nevertheless the situation is different now from what it was 
then. Then there existed a necessity, if the courts were to resolve the dis-
putes laid before them, for the formulation of principles for the disposi-
tion of those disputes without help from a code or from a comprehensive 
body of case law. The "Formal Style" was a response of lawyers and 
judges to the development of a mature, or at least a comprehensive, body 
of local doctrine. The period through which we are now passing presents 
a different picture. We have a mature body of doctrine which lawyers feel 
to be comprehensive, but which is felt by many to be obsolete. Tension 
results from the fact that existing doctrine commands the loyalties of many 
lawyers and of much of the community because it is law, and because the 
entire mystique of the republic calls for major, conscious change to be 
accomplished in accordance with the accepted democratic-representative 
forms. The tension will continue to exist, in all probability, unless we 
develop a thought-construct of our republican system which confers upon 
judges, if they are to be the ones who will exercise major legislative powers, 
the appearance of legitimacy in their exercise. We may be discussing a 
constitutional problem, or one which involves only a matter of education. 
If it is the latter, I doubt that Llewellyn's course, illuminating as it is, 
will accomplish the objective which he has in mind. The lawyer's image 
of the political system is formed long before he finds out anything useful 
or realistic about the work of appellate judges and the part they play in 
that political system, hence the contradiction which is felt when he does 
find out. If Llewellyn seeks to eliminate this crisis, it seems to me he must 
teach his course in the secondary schools. 
The book will be a text for judges, a handbook on prediction and 
advocacy, and a rich source of information and understanding to a lay-
man or a law student who has the good sense to study it thoughtfully. 
It will have its greatest influence, however, by refraction through the 
minds of law teachers, for it is an attempt by description to raise to the 
level of consciousness an understanding of methodology which conven-
tional curricula assume must be achieved mainly through conditioning. 
It is the teacher's task to initiate that conditioning, and his fond hope to 
shape it so that technique may be improved, or at least its development 
hastened. But he can scarcely help yearning for the day when the tech-
nique has been so well described that it may be directly taught. For him, 
therefore, Llewellyn's unmatched gifts for seeing a situation clearly, for 
cleanly verbalizing what others only feel, and for describing the obvious 
so that it may become noticeable, are uniquely useful. It would not be 
possible frequently to match the thought-clearing and breath-saving char-
acteristics of such an idea as his Bramble Bush insight into the double-
valued nature of our precedent system, but there are herein many gems of 
similar quality if not of equal weight. One which I cite as an example 
because it tickles my fancy is his reference to "the curious nature of our 
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case law rules and concepts, which (we keep forgetting) are in essence 
Platonic; somethings whose reality and essence exist 'out there' somewhere, 
felt more than grasped, indicated rather than bounded or gripped by any 
form of words at all, so that 'the same rule' can be found and recognized in 
or under seven divergent and only more or less coextensive formulations. 
In our law, 'the' rule rephrases of itself, almost, to adjust a notch or three, 
a compass point or four, to the call of sense, in what even when almost 
automatic is nonetheless highly creative 'application'" (pp. 180-81). Imagery 
such as this, in which the book is rich, fastens upon the mind of the reader 
and guarantees, if that reader be also a teacher, a direct transference 
through his own outlook to his classroom work. Further than this, the 
rationale here presented of the judge's approach to a problem case is in 
fact a paradigm for the casebook teacher's image, often enough mere fan-
tasy, of what he himself does in the classroom day by day. A feeling of kin-
ship, of self-recognition, reinforces the utility of the Llewellian descrip-
tions to guarantee a maximum effect upon the mind of the pedagogue. 
Another of the book's reviewers has ventured the judgment, probably 
sound, that first-year law students who try to swim this stream will drown in 
the attempt.2 Some of their seniors would share their fate, for Llewellyn's 
ideas do not march past in serried ranks with measured tread. They fl.ow 
over and engulf the reader. If they could but be lined up in systematic 
and less overwhelming form, they could be a large part of the antidote to 
another crisis than the one to which he has referred. His main pitch is 
that the acres and acres of shelves of appellate reports are gold mines, not 
wastelands; that there still is much to be learned from the study of appel-
late opinions, not only about law but also about life; that there is ma-
terial here easily and inexpensively available to all and sundry which 
challenges the intellect and imagination of any scholar, including the one 
whose claim is an interest not in "doctrine" but in "society." The passion 
with which the claim is made burns upon the page. Would that I could 
find some way to infect first-year law students with the same excitement; 
to get them to see their study of cases as something more than a defense 
against the call to recite and a source of outlinable two-line propositions; 
to have them experience a few times the thrill of dissecting with care a 
verbose and opaque opinion to find lying beneath the surface a reasoned 
solution, moving step by step from appellate problem to its disposition, 
dealing along the way with the adversary contentions, and with the ac-
curacy or inaccuracy of the court's logic and the extent of its consideration 
of "sense" and "policy" exposed to view; to have them see the case as some-
thing more than a key word surrounded by a hiatus. 
The appellate opinion is not only excellent material for social research, 
it is also still the optimum unit for the study of law, but it is one thing to 
2 Prosser, Book Review, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 431, 433 (1961). 
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have this conviction and another to impart it. If the student is to be 
nourished by the fruit he must pluck it himself, and this he invincibly re-
fuses to believe. Conviction is a product of personal experience, and the 
great mass of law students never see in any case what Llewellyn finds in 
the general run of cases. They fail to see, because they have not learned 
to focus. Consequently their "study" of cases soon becomes drudgery, 
meaningless drill, devoid of intellectual challenge. If they could be 
brought to see the process of decision as Llewellyn sees it, and then be 
made to understand a technique by which they can themselves observe the 
process in operation, many of the law schools' problems would be on their 
way to solution. For this reason I cannot help wishing for a synoptic ver-
sion of Llewellyn, one which could be viewed as a whole, comprehended 
in one piece, and studied en masse. What this country needs is a good C 
students' Llewellyn. 
Luke K. Cooperrider, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan 
